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Arbitrary Detention in the Counter-Terrorism 
Context: Standards for the UN Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detention 
BY ALEENA NASIR* 
Abstract: Administrative detention is a phenomenon increasingly 
used in the name of national security and counter-terrorism, but alongside 
a dangerous trend of arbitrary detentions at odds with human rights and 
international law. States use broad and vague definitions of terrorism as 
justifications for detentions that happen outside the confines of the law 
both domestically and internationally. States of emergency and military 
occupations further derogate dramatically from human rights and the 
freedom from arbitrary detention, resulting in a campaign against oppo-
sition under the guise of counter-terrorism. The current trend of arbitrary 
detention evinces a need for stronger standards protecting human rights 
in all areas of the world and the application of those standards in cases 
before the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. This Note pro-
poses substantive and procedural standards to codify and strengthen the 
Working Group’s jurisprudence on arbitrary detentions in the counter-
terrorism context, especially during states of emergency. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Around 4:00 a.m. on May 14, 2017, some forty to fifty Israeli sol-
diers broke down the front door of Ahmad Qatamesh’s home in the al-
Bireh neighborhood of Ramallah, Palestine.1 The house was empty, so 
the soldiers went over to Ahmad’s brother’s house, broke down his door, 
and forced him to walk them to Ahmad in a nearby home at gunpoint.2 
Three days after arresting Ahmad, a military commander signed an 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2021, The George Washington University Law School; B.A. 2017, Johns Hopkins 
University. 
 1. Israel: Release Palestinian Prisoner of Conscience Detained Without Charge or Trial, 
AMNESTY INT’L (May 24, 2017, 9:39 AM), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/05/ 
israel-release-palestinian-prisoner-of-conscience-detained-without-charge-or-trial/. 
 2. Id. 
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administrative order authorizing his three-month detention with no listed 
criminal offense.3 Neither Ahmad nor his family are strangers to this pro-
ceeding—it marks Ahmad’s fourth arbitrary detention since the 1970’s. 
A prominent writer, professor, and activist, Ahmad was first imprisoned 
in the 1970’s for over four years after he was accused by the Israeli gov-
ernment of being a leader in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Pal-
estine, a designated terrorist organization.4 In 1992, he was arrested again 
and spent the next six years in administrative detention until his release 
in 1998—the longest ever detention without trial of a Palestinian pris-
oner.5 His third detention was in April 2011, where Ahmad was interro-
gated for all of ten minutes before being detained for another two and a 
half years until December 2013.6 Ahmad spoke of Israel’s practice of ar-
bitrary detention at his hearing at the Ofer military court in 2011: “You 
are destroying my life and I want to know why. As a human being I have 
my own mind and I am educated, and I want to know what I am detained 
for. The military prosecution talks of its professionalism, and meanwhile 
I have no rights?”7 Amnesty International has repeatedly called for Ah-
mad’s release from arbitrary detention in Israel as a prisoner of con-
science.8 Ahmad Qatamesh is just one story of the over 800,000 Palestin-
ians detained in Israel since 1967—constituting around 20% of the total 
Palestinian population.9 
Arbitrary detention occurs outside the confines and the protections 
of the law. A person’s unjustified arrest and deprivation of liberty violates 
both domestic and international law. From surveillance and unlawful ar-
rest to the often misled and corrupt trials, arbitrary detention violates a 
person’s and prisoner’s rights every step of the way. Arbitrary detention 
 
 3. Id. 
 4. Patrick Strickland, Israel Jails Writer Ahmad Qatamesh Without Charges, AL JAZEERA 
(May 21, 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/05/israel-jails-writer-ahmad-
qatamesh-charges-170521063552255.html. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is a 
left-wing political party that has been designated by the U.S., E.U., Canada, Japan, and Australia 
as a terrorist organization. Israel & Palestine, CHARITY & SEC. NETWORK (Aug. 30, 2016), https://
charityandsecurity.org/country/palestine/. 
 5. Palestinian Writer Among Dozens Arrested by Israel, MIDDLE E. EYE (Dec. 24, 2019), 
https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israel-detains-dozens-palestinians-including-renowned-pro-
fessor. 
 6. Starved of Justice: Palestinians Detained Without Trial by Israel, AMNESTY INT’L (June 
2012), https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/israelopt_starved_of_justice_06
0612-final.pdf. 
 7. Id. at 5. 
 8. Israel: Release Palestinian Prisoner of Conscience Detained Without Charge or Trial, 
supra note 1. 
 9. Administrative Detention, ADDAMEER (July 2017), http://www.addameer.org/israeli_mil-
itary_judicial_system/administrative_detention. 
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is often used as a tool of political suppression and intimidation. The na-
ture of detention deprives a person of their liberties and human rights.10 
The practice of administrative detention necessitates more stringent legal 
standards to ensure the protection of basic human rights. Pretrial deten-
tion under domestic and international legal standards can be lawful, but 
the nature of many conflicts creates a vacuum of due process that trans-
forms an otherwise legal arrest into arbitrary detention. With every judi-
cial system and criminal system comes the possibility of abuse of power 
and fear for security in times of crisis.11 In these situations, arbitrary ar-
rests persist regardless of the state’s type of government or Freedom 
House ranking.12 As the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights wrote, “All countries are confronted by the practice of arbitrary 
detention. It knows no boundaries . . ..”13 
Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) guarantees everyone the right to liberty and the right to be free 
of arbitrary detention.14 Anyone who is arrested shall be afforded certain 
procedures, including being informed of the charges against them, 
promptly appearing before a judge, and having the right to take proceed-
ings before a court.15 This codification of international law on arbitrary 
detention expands on the fundamental law established in Article 9 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which states, “No one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.”16 Detention itself 
is not a violation of international law, but these instruments establish the 
parameters for states to identify what is arbitrary.17 Arbitrariness does not 
equate to illegality, but it is interpreted more broadly to include “inappro-
priateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law,” along 
 
 10. Arbitrary Detention, TRIAL INT’L, https://trialinternational.org/topics-post/arbitrary-de-
tention (last visited Nov. 13, 2020). 
 11. Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situation (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) American Convention 
on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, Inter-Am. Ct. of H.R., (ser. A) No. 8, ¶¶ 20–21 
(Jan. 30, 1987). 
 12. Freedom House publishes an annual report assessing the condition of political rights and 
civil liberties for countries across the world according to a numerical rating. It is the most widely 
used rating of its kind to assess the state of democracy and human freedom worldwide. Freedom in 
the World, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2020). 
 13. U.N., Off. of the High Comm’r for Hum. Rts. [OHCHR], Fact Sheet No. 26, The Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detention, at 2 (May 2000), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publica-
tions/FactSheet26en.pdf [hereinafter Fact Sheet No. 26]. 
 14. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9(1), Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter 999 U.N.T.S. 171]. 
 15. Id. art. 9(2)–(4). 
 16. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 9 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 17. See Fact Sheet No. 26, supra note 13, ¶ 4. 
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with unreasonableness and lack of necessity.18  When the procedures are 
ignored, the charges hidden, the hearings delayed, and the courts avoided, 
lawful detention can quickly become arbitrary. 
The phenomenon of arbitrary detention is international, traditional, 
and perennial, yet easily transformed from a necessary security measure 
to an unlawful violation of human rights. States justify it as needed to 
protect against terrorism and ensure national security.19 However, those 
same states commonly abuse this rationale by jailing dissidents and inno-
cents, such as Ahmad Qatamesh, without due process.20 During the de-
tention process, certain procedural and substantive standards must be met 
to ensure compliance with international law and justice, even for sus-
pected terrorists. Any detention without a charge is unlawful but states 
often use terrorism as a vague catch-all ground for detention when a valid 
charge may not exist. Pretrial detention is legal in certain circumstances 
but tends to be abused by states who look to silence or intimidate oppo-
nents.21 As arbitrary detention becomes more commonplace in times of 
conflict or crisis, it is natural that fears of further terrorist activity or con-
flict lead to heightened levels of detention and arrests. States often use 
vague terrorism justifications to detain political dissidents, journalists, or 
opposing party members.22 In states of emergency these crackdowns es-
calate alongside dangerous levels of arbitrary detentions.23 It is therefore 
imperative to set sufficient, unwavering standards around the arbitrary 
detention of innocent persons in domestic and international law. 
When national judicial systems fail to provide adequate protections 
for persons in detention, there are few supra-national institutions with the 
competence and the authority to address these systemic human rights vi-
olations. The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention is 
one of the first working groups set up by the United Nations and has the 
specific mandate to consider cases of arbitrary detention. Its 
 
 18. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS. IN COOPERATION WITH THE INT’L BAR ASS’N, 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 165 (2003) [hereinafter ADMINISTRATION 
OF JUSTICE]. 
 19. OHCHR, Fact Sheet No. 32, Terrorism and Counter-terrorism, at 24, 36 (July 7, 2008), 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Factsheet32EN.pdf [hereinafter Fact Sheet No. 
32]. 
 20. Arbitrary Detention, CTR. FOR JUST. & ACCOUNTABILITY, https://cja.org/human-rights-
issues/arbitrary-detention/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2020). 
 21. U.N. Hum. Rts. Council [HRC], Opinions Adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention at its Seventy-Ninth Session, 21-25 August 2017, ¶ 38, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2017/
61 (Sept. 15, 2017). 
 22. HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, ¶ 52, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/21 
(Feb. 16, 2009) [hereinafter A/HRC/10/21]. 
 23. HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, ¶ 59, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/4 
(Jan. 10, 2008) [hereinafter A/HRC/7/4]. 
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jurisprudence thus far on terrorism and arbitrary detention has been 
sparse, although hinting at the need for further discussion on these issues. 
The frequency and brutality with which many arbitrary detentions occur 
today necessitate a codified international legal standard for the Working 
Group to use in its future case deliberations, especially in situations of 
military occupation and states of emergency. 
This Note will analyze the Working Group’s jurisprudence on arbi-
trary detentions in the name of terrorism, including state justifications for 
terrorism charges and legal guarantees of substantive and procedural due 
process, especially in states of emergency. This Note will further propose 
a set of legal standards for states and the Working Group to use in cases 
of arbitrary detention on terrorism grounds. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  International Law on Arbitrary Detention 
The primary international legal principle on arbitrary detention 
comes from Article 9 of the ICCPR, which ensures the right to liberty and 
security of the person.24 Article 9 also provides that arrestees shall be in-
formed of the charges against them, be brought promptly before a judge 
to take proceedings before a court, and have an enforceable right to com-
pensation.25 
Besides the principal document of the ICCPR, Article 9 of the 
UDHR is another germane instrument, providing that “no one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.”26 As a right acknowl-
edged in this cornerstone document, arbitrary detention is understood as 
illegal to almost every state that is a signatory to the UDHR.27 While nei-
ther the ICCPR nor the UDHR are binding legal documents, their wide-
spread ratifications and universal codification evidence jus cogens, or a 
customary international norm against arbitrary detention.28 
In addition to international agreements, there are several regional 
instruments that also ban arbitrary detention. Article 5 of the European 
 
 24. 999 U.N.T.S. 171, supra note 14, art. 9. 
 25. Id. 
 26. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 16, arts. 9, 10. 
 27. Although the UDHR is not a binding legal document, it has inspired and given rise to 
multiple binding international legal documents and domestic legislation. Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/universal-declaration-
of-human-rights/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2020). 
 28. See Deliberation No. 9 concerning the definition and scope of arbitrary deprivation of 
liberty under customary international law. HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on Arbitrary Deten-
tion, ¶ 43, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/44 (Dec. 24, 2012) [hereinafter A/HRC/22/44]. 
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Convention on Human Rights and Article 7(1) of the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights both provide that everyone has the right to liberty 
and security.29 Article 6 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights also states more specifically, “No one may be deprived of his free-
dom except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law. In 
particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained.”30 
As a widely codified and accepted right, the right of protection from 
arbitrary detention is binding on states internationally and is mirrored in 
domestic legislation. In practice, however, states venture past the con-
fines of international law and often bend their own domestic laws on ad-
ministrative detention to allow for certain arrests, particularly in times of 
conflict. 
 
 29.  The United Nations Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms provide: 
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of 
his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed 
by law: (a)  the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; 
(b)  the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non- compliance with the lawful order 
of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; 
(c)  the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him 
before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an 
offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an 
offence or fleeing after having done so; (d)  the detention of a minor by lawful order 
for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of 
bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e)  the lawful detention of persons 
for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, 
alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to 
prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against 
whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.  
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he un-
derstands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him.  
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) 
of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by 
law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or 
to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.  
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to 
take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by 
a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.  
5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the 
provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation. 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 5, Nov. 4, 1950, 
E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. See also Organization of American States, American Convention 
on Human Rights, art. 7(1), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (defining a 
similar right to personal liberty). 
 30. Org. of African Unity [OAU], African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 6, 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (June 27, 1981). 
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B.  The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 
The Commission on Human Rights established the UN Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detention in 1991 with the purpose “to investigate 
detention imposed arbitrarily and inconsistently with international stand-
ards in the UDHR and legal instruments accepted by the States con-
cerned.”31 The Working Group is the only charter-based mechanism at 
the UN mandated to consider individual complaints from individuals 
around the world.32 It can also receive cases from governments, IGOS, 
NGOs, and individuals’ representatives.33 Moreover, the Working Group 
is the sole UN body entrusted with a specific mandate to deal with cases 
of arbitrary detention.34 The Working Group submits its opinions to the 
Human Rights Council and can investigate cases of arbitrary or unlawful 
detention, seek and receive information, and present reports to the Com-
mission on Human Rights.35 The five independent experts serving as 
members are appointed by the Chairman of the Human Rights Council 
and must carry out their tasks with “discretion, objectivity, and independ-
ence.”36 The Working Group holds three sessions every year and its man-
date is extended by the Commission on Human Rights every three years.37 
The procedure for submitting an application to the Working Group 
involves four stages.38 First, the individual must bring the matter to the 
attention of the Working Group, usually through an optional question-
naire.39 Second, the host government is given an opportunity to respond 
and refute the allegations within ninety days.40 Third, the government’s 
reply is transmitted to the original petitioner for final comments.41 Fi-
nally, the Working Group issues its decision and recommendations on the 
case.42 
 
 31. HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/47 
(June 30, 2014) [hereinafter A/HRC/27/47]. 
 32. Id. Charter-based mechanisms are established pursuant to provisions in the United Nations 
Charter. See U.N. Documentation: Human Rights, U.N. DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD LIBR., https://re-
search.un.org/en/docs/humanrights/charter (last visited Nov. 13, 2020). 
 33. See Jared M. Genser & Margaret K. Winterkorn-Meikle, The Intersection of Politics and 
International Law: The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention in Theory and in 
Practice, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 687, 695 (2008). 
 34. See Deliberations of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, ¶ 37 (Oct. 17, 2013), 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Detention/CompilationWGADDeliberation.pdf. 
 35. Fact Sheet No. 26, supra note 13, at 3. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 5. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 5–6. 
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Cases are considered arbitrary if they fall into one or more of five 
categories, including when there is (1) no possible legal basis for the de-
tention; (2) the detention results from the exercise of certain protected 
freedoms; (3) non-observance of international norms on the right to a fair 
trial; (4) prolonged administrative custody of asylum seekers, immi-
grants, or refugees; and (5) the detention constitutes a violation of inter-
national law on the grounds of discrimination of certain protected cate-
gories.43 
The Working Group has written hundreds of decisions on cases sub-
mitted by several member states.44 Working Group decisions are not le-
gally binding but serve as an international quasi-judicial alternative to 
justice denied to petitioners in their own domestic courts that have failed 
them.45 A decision in favor of the petitioner, as is usually the case, can 
have a shining light effect of holding the state government accountable 
for its actions.46 Decisions also further arbitrary detention jurisprudence 
in international law, facilitating discussion and collaboration by member 
states on critical human rights issues.47 
C.  Terrorism as a Justification for Detention 
While the right to liberty and security is violated in cases of arbitrary 
detention, a state generally owes this same right to its population in pre-
venting terrorist attacks and ensuring national security.48 Human rights 
are at issue on both sides of preventing and prosecuting terrorism, but the 
problem arises with the latter when detaining persons accused of terrorist 
activity. Human Rights Watch notes that “[j]ust as terrorism targets inno-
cent civilians, so too are innocent civilians becoming casualties in the 
international campaign against terrorism.”49 The presumption of inno-
cence until proven guilty is a guarantee that must be provided even in the 
counter-terrorist context. 
 
 43. OHCHR , Individual Complaints and Urgent Appeals, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/
Detention/Pages/Complaints.aspx (last visited Nov. 13, 2020). 
 44. See OHCHR, Opinions Adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, https://
www.ohchr.org/en/issues/detention/pages/opinionsadoptedbythewgad.aspx (last visited Nov. 13, 
2020). 
 45. Genser & Winterkorn-Meikle, supra note 33, at 690, 704. 
 46. Id. at 690. 
 47. Id. at 698. 
 48. Fact Sheet No. 32, supra note 19, at 1. 
 49. In the Name of Counter-Terrorism: Human Rights Abuses Worldwide, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH, at 2 (Mar. 25, 2003), https://www.hrw.org/legacy/un/chr59/counter-terrorism-bck.pdf. 
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The universal consensus and war against terror creates almost a zone 
of safety around any state action taken in the name of counter-terrorism.50 
The vague definition of terrorism enlarges that zone of safety to danger-
ous levels where a state’s actions go unquestioned, heightening the pos-
sibility of derogation of human rights and personal liberty, often with a 
state labeling any and all opponents as terrorists to allow such deroga-
tion.51 Such zones of safety “strengthen the state’s hand to justify 
breaches of non-derogable rights… and are clearly instrumental in vali-
dating a broad range of limitations on derogable rights.”52 The UN Spe-
cial Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fun-
damental freedoms while countering terrorism, Fionnuala Ni Aolain, 
notes, “[T]he vocabulary of terrorism and counterterrorism remains ubiq-
uitous in state positioning and continues to provide a justificatory and 
legitimizing rationale for legislative and executive action.”53 The global 
war on terror has created a worldwide sense of panic forcing state gov-
ernments to react with a form of threat management that results in higher 
rates of arbitrary detentions. 
The misuse and abuse of national security and counter-terrorism 
laws directly conflicts with international law on arbitrary detention. The 
Working Group has historically expressed its concerns regarding arbi-
trary detention in counter-terrorism contexts, including the extreme 
length of detentions and deprivation of due process of the detainees.54 The 
Working Group has noted multiple times that vague and broad definitions 
of terrorism “bring within their fold the innocent and the suspect alike 
and thereby increase the risk of arbitrary detention.”55 In 2009, given the 
growing trend in terrorism allegations, the Working Group outlined cer-
tain principles to “be used in relation to deprivation of liberty of persons 
accused of acts of terrorism.”56 The principles closely followed the estab-
lished rights in the ICCPR and UDHR, and the Working Group has pre-
viously recommended the Human Rights Council consider setting up a 
special forum to work on arbitrary detention in the counter-terrorism 
 
 50. Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, The Cloak and Dagger Game of Derogation, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
EMERGENCIES 124, 134 (Evan J. Criddle, ed., 2016). 
 51. Derogation in Times of Public Emergency, U.N OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, https://
www.unodc.org/e4j/en/terrorism/module-7/key-issues/derogation-during-public-emergency.html 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2020). 
 52. Ní Aoláin, supra note 50, at 135. 
 53. Id. at 129. 
 54. A/HRC/7/4, supra note 23, ¶¶  60–61. 
 55. U.N. Comm’n on Hum. Rts. [CHR], Rep. of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
¶ 64, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/3/Add.3 (Dec. 15, 2003). 
 56. A/HRC/10/21, supra note 22, ¶ 53. 
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context, highlighting the uniqueness and importance of the issue.57 Given 
the Working Group’s heightened awareness of the unique question of ar-
bitrary detentions in the counter-terrorism context, there is a high need 
for stronger codified standards in its jurisprudence. 
There is no official definition of terrorism in international humani-
tarian law, therefore, states have established their own varying degrees of 
terrorism legislation.58 States are often afforded broad latitude to deter-
mine threats and responses without serious oversight. In some cases, this 
exercise of power can, intentionally or not, increase panic, chaos, and in-
security. The UN Counter-Terrorism Task Force states that “[a]ll coun-
ter-terrorism measures, including those involving the deprivation of lib-
erty, must comply fully with States’ international human rights 
obligations.”59 Certain international legal instruments provide guidance 
to states in defining terrorism in their national laws, although states are 
given considerable deference in drafting their own terrorism legislation.60 
This flexibility can lead to dangerous derogations of human rights on a 
national level. 
D.  States of Emergency 
The Working Group recognizes that the main causes of arbitrary de-
tention are related to states of emergency.61 While fundamental human 
rights are codified in international treaties, these treaties also allow for 
derogations, or “‘extraordinary limitations’ on the exercise of human 
rights,” in extraordinary circumstances, such as public emergency.62 Alt-
hough Article 9 is not expressly listed in Article 4(2) of the ICCPR as a 
non-derogable right, it nonetheless takes on the principle of non-deroga-
tion.63 Article 4 of the ICCPR says that in times of public emergency, 
states may take measures derogating from their obligations under the 
ICCPR.64 However, such measures must be consistent with states’ other 
obligations under international law.65 
 
 57. Id. ¶ 55. 
 58. Fact Sheet No. 32, supra note 19, at 8–9, 11. 
 59. U.N., Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force [CTITF], Basic Human Rights Ref-
erence Guide: Detention in the Context of Countering Terrorism, ¶ 11 (Oct. 2014), https://www.
ohchr.org/EN/newyork/Documents/DetentionCounteringTerrorism.pdf. 
 60. Fact Sheet No. 32, supra note 19, at 5–7. 
 61. CHR, Rep. of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, ¶ 106, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/
40 (Dec. 15, 1996). 
 62. ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 16, 814–15. 
 63. See 999 U.N.T.S. 171, supra note 14,  arts. 4(2), 9. 
 64. Id. art. 4(1). 
 65. Id. 
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The Human Rights Committee has interpreted Article 4 of the 
ICCPR to read that although certain rights are derogable, states must still 
follow the principle of proportionality and measures taken in derogation 
must be “required by the exigencies of the situation.”66 The Human Rights 
Committee further states that the specific inclusion of certain fundamen-
tal rights in Article 4 as non-derogable recognizes the peremptory nature 
of those fundamental rights, but the list of peremptory norms extends be-
yond the scope of Article 2 as well.67 The Committee stated: 
States parties may in no circumstances invoke article 4 of the 
Covenant as justification for acting in violation of humanitarian 
law or peremptory norms of international law, for instance by 
taking hostages, by imposing collective punishments, through 
arbitrary deprivations of liberty or by deviating from fundamen-
tal principles of fair trial, including the presumption of inno-
cence.68 
The Human Rights Committee therefore recognizes the fundamen-
tal guarantee against arbitrary detention as non-derogable.69 The Working 
Group has also stated that the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of lib-
erty constitutes jus cogens as a fundamental, overriding principle in in-
ternational law and is “fully applicable in all situations.”70 Several UN 
bodies and international organizations thus hold that Article 9 is a non-
derogable right and cannot be suspended, even in a state of emergency. 
In a state of war, the standards for arbitrary detention change, allow-
ing states to take measures as required by the exigencies of the situation 
for national security. General Comment No. 29 on states of emergency 
notes the importance of states not abusing their emergency powers by 
declaring unnecessary states of emergency.71 The Human Rights Com-
mittee cautions against derogations from human rights during states of 
emergency and limits any derogations to “those strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation.”72 Furthermore, General Comment 35 on Ar-
ticle 9 of the ICCPR emphasizes that Article 9 against arbitrary detention 
 
 66. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 29, Article 4: States of Emer-
gency, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001) [hereinafter General Comment 
29]. 
 67. Id. ¶ 11. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 35, Article 9: Liberty and Secu-
rity of Person, ¶ 66, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35 (Dec. 16, 2014) [hereinafter General Comment 35] 
(“[I]nsofar as even situations covered by article 4 cannot justify a deprivation of liberty that is 
unreasonable or unnecessary under the circumstances.”). 
 70. A/HRC/22/44, supra note 28, ¶ 51. 
 71. General Comment 29, supra note 66, ¶ 3. 
72.   Id. ¶ 4. 
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should be read complementarily with other rules of international human-
itarian law in armed conflict and should not be derogated from even in 
times of war.73 The Working Group thus heavily scrutinizes states of 
emergency when used as a justification by states to derogate from the 
guarantee against arbitrary detention.74 
E.  Relevant Thematic Areas in the Working Group’s Case Law 
This Section lays out several growing thematic areas in the Working 
Group’s jurisprudence on terrorism, including how to analyze a sufficient 
justification for administrative detention, particularly in states of emer-
gency. First, the Working Group has exhibited a pattern of expressing 
concern for state laws on terrorism and the broad definitions of terrorism 
within them. Second, the Working Group’s jurisprudence contains a 
theme of caution for the reasons for arrest, primarily regarding charges 
of membership in a terrorist organization and violations of free speech. 
Third, the procedural guarantees of prompt and proper legal process and 
due process rights are acknowledged consistently and through a focused 
lens in states of emergency. 
1.  State Definitions of Terrorism 
With no international definition of terrorism, states are free to place 
their own limits on the definition of a crime of terrorist involvement such 
as the crime of an act of terror or membership in a terrorist organization.75 
The Working Group has persistently highlighted the dangers of such var-
ying and vague definitions, although it could more strongly call upon 
states to reform their domestic legislations. 
Turkey presents a prime example of Working Group jurisprudence 
of cases during states of emergency. Following the failed coup in 2016, 
President Erdogan declared a state of emergency lasting for two years.76 
Mass arrests of journalists, political dissidents, opponents, human rights 
defenders, and lawyers on terrorism charges ensued, with the government 
often claiming a terrorist connection with the Fethullah Terror Organiza-
tion (FETO), who were associated with the 2016 coup.77 A seminal 
 
 73. General Comment 35, supra note 69, ¶¶ 64–65. 
 74. See El Hadji Malick Sow (Chairperson-Rapporteur), Rep. of the Working Group on Ar-
bitrary Detention, ¶¶ 72–73, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/30 (Jan. 18, 2010). 
 75. Fact Sheet No. 32, supra note 19, at 39. 
 76. Peter Kenyon, Turkey’’s State of Emergency Ends, While Erdogan’s Power Grows and 
‘‘Purge’’ Continues, NPR (July 26, 2018, 10:11 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/26/63230775
5/turkeys-state-of-emergency-ends-while-erdogans-power-grows-and-purge-continues. 
 77. Lawyers On Trial: Abusive Prosecutions and Erosion of Fair Trial Rights in Turkey, 
HUM. RTS. WATCH (April 2019), https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/04/10/lawyers-trial/abusive-
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Working Group case on Turkish terrorist designations is the case of 
Hamza Yaman. In the Working Group’s recent Opinion No. 78/2018 
from Turkey concerning Hamza Yaman, the Court found the Turkish au-
thorities had failed to establish a legal basis for Yaman’s detention, ren-
dering the detention arbitrary.78 Yaman was a human rights defender and 
charged under the Turkish Criminal Code for membership in a terrorist 
organization.79 During Stage 2 of the Working Group process, the gov-
ernment of Turkey responded to Yaman’s complaint by pointing to the 
nationwide state of emergency and its notification of derogation under 
the ICCPR.80 While the Working Group acknowledged the legal suffi-
ciency of the notification, it stated in its decision that “in order for a dep-
rivation of liberty to have a legal basis, it is not sufficient that there is a 
law which may authorize the arrest.”81 The Working Group thus focused 
on the specific domestic terrorism legislation and its unlawful application 
in detaining suspected terrorists. 
Additionally, the Working Group regularly expresses concern over 
vague and broad state definitions of terrorism and the dangers they pose. 
For example, in Opinion No. 42/2019 concerning Essam El-Haddad and 
Gehad El-Haddad of Egypt, the Working Group considered the vague 
provisions of Egypt’s antiterrorism law and highlighted that it “could be 
used to deprive individuals of their liberty without a specific legal basis 
and violate the due process of law.”82 In Opinion No. 10/2018 concerning 
Walled Abulkhair of Saudi Arabia, the Working Group reiterated its con-
cern “that antiterrorism laws ‘by using an extremely vague and broad def-
inition of terrorism, bring within their fold the innocent and the suspect 
alike and thereby increase the risk of arbitrary detention.’”83 The Working 
 
prosecutions-and-erosion-fair-trial-rights-turkey. The U.S. State Department 2018 Human Rights 
Report on Turkey noted, Prosecutors used a broad definition of terrorism and threats to national 
security, and in some cases, according to defense lawyers and opposition groups, used what ap-
peared to be legally questionable evidence to file criminal charges against and prosecute a broad 
range of individuals, including journalists, opposition politicians (primarily of the pro-Kurdish 
HDP), activists, and others critical of the government. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democ-
racy, H.R. and Lab., Turkey 2018 Human Rights Report 15–16 (2018). 
 78. HRC, Opinions Adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its Eighty-Third 
Session, 19-23 November 2018, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2018/78 (Jan. 31, 2019) [hereinafter 
WGAD 2018/78]. 
 79. Id. ¶ 7. 
 80. Id. ¶¶ 39–40. 
 81. Id. ¶ 69. 
 82. HRC, Opinions Adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its Eighty-Fifth 
Session, 12-16 August 2019, ¶ 60, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2019/42 (Oct. 3, 2019). 
 83. HRC, Opinions Adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its Eighty-First 
Session, 17-26 April 2018, ¶ 56, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2018/10 (July 4, 2018) [hereinafter 
WGAD 2018/10]. 
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Group often reiterates that “the prohibition of terrorist conduct must be 
framed in such a way that: the law is adequately accessible so that the 
individual has a proper indication of how the law limits his or her con-
duct.”84 While such concerns about state terrorism definitions take up no 
more than a few paragraphs in the Working Group’s opinions, they have 
far-reaching consequences in every state’s judicial system and require 
significant reform and attention to prevent future human rights abuses. 
2.  Specificity of Warrant and Reason for Arrest 
A second thematic area in the counter-terrorism context is the reason 
for the arrest and specificity of allegations in the warrant. The Working 
Group will look to the language of the arresting document and evidence 
cited in determining whether a detainee’s rights were violated in contra-
vention of international human rights law in accordance with the five cat-
egories of cases.85 
In Opinion No. 60/2017 concerning Andualem Aragie Walle, the 
Working Group addressed Ethiopia’s Anti-Terrorism Proclamation, 
which Aragie was arrested for criticizing.86 Ethiopian authorities accused 
Aragie of spying for “foreign forces” and being involved in staging ter-
rorist attacks.87 Aragie’s petition noted the vagueness of his charge docu-
ment and insufficient information for his arrest under the Criminal Code 
and Anti-Terrorism Proclamation.88 In its decision, the Working Group 
cited the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ resolution 
on Ethiopia, noting its grave alarm at the arrests of journalists and politi-
cal opposition members charged with terrorism.89 The Anti-Terrorism 
Proclamation was so vague and enabling that it effectively “provided the 
framework for arbitrary detention.”90 The Working Group decision tied 
the arbitrariness of the arrest and subsequent detention with the originat-
ing law, and criticized the state government for effectively legislating to 
allow arbitrary detentions. 
Another example is Opinion No. 472018 concerning Hisham Ah-
med Awad Jaafar from Egypt, where the petitioner, a journalist, was 
 
 84. Id. ¶ 56. 
 85. Individual Complaints and Urgent Appeals, supra note 43. 
 86. HRC, Opinions Adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its Seventy-
Ninth Session, 21-25 August 2017, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2017/60, (Oct. 5, 2017). 
 87. Id. ¶ 11. 
 88. Id. ¶ 13. 
 89. Id. ¶ 43. 
 90. Id. ¶ 47. 
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detained for being on the terrorist list.91 The petition noted that Jaafar’s 
detention followed a pattern of arbitrary detentions of journalists and ad-
vocates under terrorism charges.92 The Working Group stated in its deci-
sion that Egyptian authorities seemed to only target Jaafar for his political 
activities, constituting a violation of the UDHR, which protects against 
discrimination for political and other opinions.93 The acknowledgement 
of what is terrorist activity versus what is political opinion and freedom 
of speech is an integral takeaway from the Working Group’s Jaafar deci-
sion and should be expanded upon to create comprehensive guidelines in 
future cases. 
The Working Group has also addressed terrorism-based detention 
as a pretense for religious persecution in the Gaybullo Jalilov case.94 
Jalilov was an Uzbek human rights activist arrested for religious extrem-
ism and terrorism.95 The Working Group found that the Uzbek govern-
ment provided insufficient evidence of a link between Jalilov and an ex-
tremist organization, and deemed his detention arbitrary for “being a 
practicing Muslim and for criticizing the Uzbek government’s treatment 
of Muslims.”96 The Working Group therefore found a Category V viola-
tion as Uzbekistan deprived Jalilov of his liberty on discriminatory 
grounds based on his religion rather than on a valid terrorism charge.97 
Finally, the Working Group addressed the substantive legality of 
Hamza Yaman’s detention in Opinion No. 78/2018, which the govern-
ment held as valid because Yaman was a member of a terrorist organiza-
tion as a continuous crime. However, the Working Group rejected the 
government’s argument as “contrary to the presumption of innocence.”98 
This lack of flagrante delicto was also noted in Opinion No. 53/2019 
from Turkey on Mr. and Mrs. Göksan.99 In the Göksan opinion, the 
 
 91. HRC, Opinions Adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its Eighty-Sec-
ond Session, 20-24 August 2018, ¶¶ 4, 20, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2018/47 (Dec. 17, 2018) 
[hereinafter WGAD 2018/47]. 
 92. Id. ¶ 38. 
 93. Id. ¶ 81. 
 94. David Weissbrodt & Brittany Mitchel, The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention: Procedures and Summary of Jurisprudence, 38 HUM. RTS. Q. 655, 698 (2016); see also 
HRC, Opinions Adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its Sixty-Sixth Session, 
29 April-3 May 2013, ¶¶ 69–76, U.N. Doc A/HRC/WGAD/2013/4, (July 25, 2013) [hereinafter 
WGAD 2013/4]. 
 95. WGAD 2013/4, supra note 94,  ¶¶ 69–76. 
 96. Weissbrodt & Mitchell, supra note 94, at 698. 
 97. WGAD 2013/4, supra note 94,  ¶ 76. 
 98. WGAD 2018/78, supra note 78, ¶ 70. 
 99. HRC, Opinions Adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its Eighty-Fifth 
Session, 12-16 August 2019, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2019/53 (Sept. 18, 2019) [hereinafter 
WGAD 2019/53]. Flagrante delicto means a blazing offense. 
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Working Group commented on Turkey’s designation of FETO as a ter-
rorist organization, citing the Council of Europe Commissioner for Hu-
man Rights on the need for evidence of illegal activity to criminalize 
membership in an organization rather than just pure affiliation.100 In the 
Göksan case, the Working Group denied the terrorist label given by the 
Turkish government and declared their detention arbitrary for discrimi-
nation on the basis of political opinion.101 
Another relevant finding from the Yaman case is the Working 
Group’s ruling on social media, which found that the government had not 
adequately argued how Yaman’s alleged conduct demonstrated his mem-
bership in a terrorist organization.102 This finding heightens the standard 
of evidence for online terrorist involvement and can be expanded upon in 
future cases. The Working Group in its deliberations has noted this new 
phenomenon and observed, “some States are inclined to resort to depri-
vation of liberty, asserting that the use of the Internet in a given case 
serves terrorist purposes, whereas, in fact, this proves later to be just a 
pretext to restrict freedom of expression and repress political oppo-
nents.”103 The Working Group often makes a point to distinguish between 
true crimes of terror and detention based on political opinion and should 
reaffirm this difference in future cases. 
3.  Procedural Guarantees and Due Process 
In addition to the substantive contours of the terrorism charges, the 
Working Group adjudicates on procedural guarantees of due process and 
the right to a fair trial, as stated in the ICCPR. Article 9 of the ICCPR 
provides that arrestees must be informed of the reasons for their arrest, be 
brought promptly before a judge, and have a court decide without delay 
on the lawfulness of their detention.104 These are the baseline procedural 
guarantees against arbitrary detention that lay the foundation to prevent 
security-based detentions from violating international law. The Working 
Group’s decisions will easily respond to allegations of denial of due pro-
cess and unsafe detention conditions. The Group has even authored a re-
port titled “The United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on Rem-
edies and Procedures on the Right of Anyone Deprived of Their Liberty 
 
 100. Id. ¶¶ 76–77. FETO, or the Gülen movement, is an Islamist movement designated as a 
terrorist organization by Turkey. Turkey Coup: What is Gulen Movement and What Does it Want?, 
BBC NEWS (July 21, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36855846. 
 101. WGAD 2019/53, supra note 99, ¶ 90. 
 102. WGAD 2018/78, supra note 78. 
 103. Leïla Zerrougui (Chairperson-Rappourteur), Rep. of the Working Group on Arbitrary De-
tention, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/7 (Dec. 12, 2005). 
 104. 999 U.N.T.S. 171, supra note 14,  art. 9. 
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to Bring Proceedings Before a Court” to provide guidance to states in 
complying with international law.105 
The challenge of procedural guarantees in the counter-terrorism 
context is to guarantee a neutral arbiter in a timely fashion. For example, 
in Case No. 29/2019, the Working Group found a violation of this proce-
dural guarantee when a minor was not brought before a judge until 244 
days after his arrest.106 Detainees must also be promptly informed of the 
charges against them, ideally at the time of arrest.107 Yet in preventative 
counter-terrorism detentions, this guarantee is often subsumed by the 
state’s interest in containing terrorist threats before they occur. The rea-
sons for arrest can be speculative at best. To illustrate, in the case of 
Nizaar Zakka, the Working Group found a violation of the ICCPR when 
Mr. Zakka was not informed of the charges against him by Iranian au-
thorities until 11 months after his arrest.108 
In addition, there must be strong evidence from governments to jus-
tify administrative detention. In the Göksans’ case, the Working Group 
found insufficient evidence on the detainees’ indictments when the Turk-
ish government only showed evidence of their use of a mobile application 
with no further link to terrorist activity.109 The right to a fair trial also 
necessitates the ability to consult a lawyer. In a case concerning a minor 
from Egypt, the Working Group found a Category III violation when a 
minor was tortured to make a confession. His lawyer was not present, and 
he did not have an opportunity to work with a lawyer to prepare his de-
fense.110 
As shown above, the Working Group regularly decides on proce-
dural guarantees and highlights the unique challenges to due process 
rights during states of emergency. The Working Group has hinted at sev-
eral customary standards for such cases, and these standards are expanded 
upon in the following section to be more normative. 
 
 105. HRC, Rep. of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/37 (Jul. 
6, 2015). 
 106. HRC, Opinions Adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its Eighty-
Fourth Session, 24 April-3 May 2019, ¶ 39, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2019/29 (Oct. 9, 2019) 
[hereinafter WGAD 2019/29]. 
 107. ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 181. 
 108. HRC, Opinions Adopted by the Working Grp. on Arbitrary Det. at its Eighty-Fourth Ses-
sion, 24 April-3 May 2019, ¶ 40(a), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2019/51 (Oct. 8, 2019). 
 109. WGAD 2018/78, supra note 78. 
 110. WGAD 2019/29, supra note 106,  ¶¶ 59, 62–63. 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
The trends on counter-terrorism in the Working Group’s jurispru-
dence are becoming increasingly relevant and must be strongly adopted 
as substantive and procedural standards to prevent arbitrary detentions. 
The Working Group has repeatedly expressed concern over the deroga-
tion of human rights during states of emergency. The Working Group 
should take a more stringent approach in its case law to confront states 
for vague definitions of terrorism and unlawful application of counter-
terrorism laws that lead to arbitrary detentions without due process of 
law. By maintaining coherent and fixed standards around arbitrary deten-
tions in the counter-terrorism context, the Working Group can strengthen 
its jurisprudence to positively impact state compliance with international 
human rights law. 
Although the Working Group has highlighted principles and guide-
posts for addressing arbitrary detention in the counter-terrorism context, 
this specific area of international law could be better codified and fol-
lowed. Detention conditions and procedural guarantees are easy to spot 
and rule on, whereas the substantive guarantees of counter-terrorism laws 
and non-arbitrary detention can prevent such detentions from happening 
on the front-end.  
A.  Substantive Standards 
While state counter-terrorist efforts are necessary in containing the 
spread of violence and terrorism, the use of the term to justify detaining 
persons has been abused by authoritarian-leaning regimes and govern-
ments. State authorities should present a warrant for arrest specifying the 
reason for arrest, detailing intelligence on why arrest of this person is 
necessary, and what state interest would be furthered by depriving this 
person of their liberty. In addition, warrants at the time of arrest should 
specify the approximate duration the state anticipates holding the suspect, 
the detention facility where the suspect will be held, and the specific form 
of detention, such as solitary confinement. The provision of this basic 
information is required under international law, including Article 10 of 
the UDHR and Article 14 of the ICCPR, regardless of the arbitrariness of 
the terrorism charges.111 
In situations of serious emergency or conflict, derogations may oc-
cur, but the Working Group and the international community must main-
tain a consistent standard to truly ensure basic human rights. International 
humanitarian law currently limits derogations under Article 4(1) of the 
 
 111. 999 U.N.T.S. 171, supra note 14, art. 14; G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 16, art. 10. 
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ICCPR to the “extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situa-
tion.”112 Any derogations must be necessary, proportional, and reasona-
ble, and not inconsistent with international law obligations.113 There must 
be stronger, more definitive lines around the requirement of reasonable-
ness, and “[a] state looking to engage in extended detention should be 
required to demonstrate more than simply a reasonable belief or suspicion 
that the suspect poses a threat.”114 The Working Group’s stated concern 
of vague and broad state definitions of terrorism can be acted upon to 
codify the standard of arbitrariness and ensure the specificity sought by 
the Working Group in its decisions. As the Working Group noted in its 
Opinion No. 10/2018 concerning Walled Abulkhair of Saudi Arabia, ter-
rorism laws must specifically lay out what is legal and what is illegal to 
afford citizens the ability to discern what is punishable conduct during 
public emergencies.115 The Working Group and the UN in general must 
take a stronger stand against derogations from human rights during public 
emergency situations and remain consistent in their condemnations to en-
courage best state practices in times of crisis. 
The Working Group has repeatedly highlighted insufficient reasons 
for administrative detentions in many of its decisions and the need for a 
stronger nexus between individuals and supposed terrorist involvement. 
The European Court of Human Rights has stated that police must 
properly interrogate detainees “about their suspected involvement in spe-
cific crimes and their suspected membership of proscribed organisations” 
if arresting someone on suspicion of being a terrorist.116 In the Yaman 
case, the Working Group has mirrored this sentiment by emphasizing the 
need to specify connections to terrorist activity, and the strength and ur-
gency of those associations.117 The Working Group should set a standard 
for association with a designated terrorist organization as opposed to 
membership in a designated terrorist organization so that individuals are 
not arbitrarily detained based on a weak historical connection to a politi-
cal party in which they no longer, or never did, participate. The Working 
Group should also require stronger evidence and a higher threshold of 
involvement in terrorist organizations to allow for preventative detention. 
Further, states should evidence a stronger nexus between the detainee and 
 
 112. 999 U.N.T.S. 171, supra note 14, art. 4(1). 
 113. Fact Sheet No. 32, supra note 19, at 29. 
 114. Monica Hakimi, International Standards for Detaining Terrorism Suspects: Moving Be-
yond the Armed Conflict-Criminal Divide, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 593, 645 (2009). 
 115. WGAD 2018/10, supra note 83, ¶ 56. 
 116. ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 183 (quoting Fox, Campbell and Hartley 
v. the United Kingdom, 182 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1, 19 (1990)). 
 117. WGAD 2018/78, supra note 78, ¶ 73. 
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terrorist organization even before an arrest can take place. For example, 
tenuous connections with designated terrorist organizations should not be 
the basis for detention. Rather, states should present concrete evidence of 
the detainee recently taking action in furtherance of terrorist activity. A 
time limitation—such as activity within the last five or ten years—can 
serve as a helpful guidepost for drawing the line between membership 
and affiliation to criminalize legitimate terrorist involvement and detain 
a suspect. 
The Working Group should also strongly consider the situation sur-
rounding the initial arrest and detention in its decisions on whether a de-
tention is arbitrary. Mass arrests often take place during or after major 
protests.118 Peaceful protests cannot on their own justify detention; in the 
frenzy of a protest, authorities have no time nor knowledge of attendees 
and cannot give a valid justification for arrest other than participating in 
the protest. Protests often engage an element of free speech and political 
opinion which is expressly protected under Article 2 of the UDHR. This 
Article is regularly cited by the Working Group as grounds for arbitrary 
detention and is an express category of the Working Group’s case law.119 
A critical part of the solution to this issue is directly addressing the 
domestic law in which arbitrary detentions principally occur. The Work-
ing Group has within its jurisprudence the optimal opportunity to address 
problematic practices and laws both on their face and in their application. 
Professor Monica Hakimi notes that the Human Rights Committee and 
European Court of Human Rights “could have—and should have—ex-
amined more carefully the domestic standards under which detentions 
were authorized.”120 While the Working Group’s opinions are not bind-
ing, they are certainly persuasive, and the Working Group can call upon 
states to review their domestic counter-terrorism legislation in opinions 
or even request state visits.121 
In general, adjudication of arbitrariness should encompass the con-
cept of proportionality that anything greater than is necessary in the situ-
ation is arbitrary. To demonstrate, detention should be permitted “only 
where the detainee himself poses a serious security threat, where 
 
 118. Take for example the protest at the Al-Aqsa Mosque in East Jerusalem following the 
United States’ recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017. See Palestinian Prisoner’s Day: 
Israel’s Use of Arbitrary Detention as a Tool of Repression and Control of Palestinians, AL-HAQ, 
(Apr. 20, 2018), http://www.alhaq.org/advocacy/6241.html. 
 119. WGAD 2018/47, supra note 91, ¶¶ 79–81. 
 120. Hakimi, supra note 114, at 645. Hakimi also notes, “The same is true of the Human Rights 
Committee’s review of the systems for pure security-based detention in India and Israel.” Id. 
 121. OHCHR, Country Visits - Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, https://www.ohchr.org
/EN/Issues/Detention/Pages/Visits.aspx (last visited Oct. 26, 2020). 
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detention is necessary to contain that threat, and where detention is cali-
brated to last no longer than necessary.”122 Detention of suspected terror-
ists seems most likely to lead to short-term detention to contain an imme-
diate threat, while any long-term detentions raise questions of 
arbitrariness of detention for illegitimate reasons. This standard should 
be continuously followed to prevent derogations from human rights in 
states of emergency. The Working Group and states should more dili-
gently consider the unique complexities in states of emergency in the 
counter-terrorism context and remain steadfast in their conviction to pre-
vent arbitrary detentions in compliance with international law. 
B.  Procedural Standards 
The basic standards of prompt and sufficient legal process, access 
to counsel, access to courts, etc., are often disregarded or ignored as the 
state of emergency continues. Given the robust history of the Working 
Group in condemning violations of procedural due process in its cases, 
the Working Group should continue to strongly condemn such violations 
in military occupations and acknowledge the unique challenges to detain-
ees in occupations and states of emergency to be granted fair trials and 
due process. 
Secrecy of evidence and prolonged detentions are the most common 
procedural faults during states of emergency. Secret evidence is a com-
mon practice in Israeli detentions of Palestinians, including that of Ah-
mad Qatamesh.123 These practices go hand in hand with the vague terror-
ism justifications offered by authorities, if any justification is given at all. 
Professor Hakimi writes, “terrorism suspects must have the prompt and 
meaningful opportunity to challenge, before a neutral arbiter, the facts 
giving rise to detention and to offer evidence in rebuttal.”124 Indeed, given 
the vagueness and broad contours of the definition of terrorism, a detainee 
needs a chance to present their case for before an impartial judiciary. 
Through the judicial process, classified security information on the de-
tainee can be discussed and even shared in evidence. The Working Group 
must further acknowledge the secrecy and classification of many docu-
ments in terrorism cases of arbitrary detention, and firmly call upon states 
to allow detainees at least some access to some intelligence information 
before their trials so they can properly work with their counsel to assert a 
defense, especially before military tribunals in states of emergency. The 
procedural guarantee of access to evidence can highlight substantive 
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flaws in the arresting document as well, as in the Göksan case where Tur-
key presented just one piece of insufficient evidence in making an atten-
uated connection to a designated terrorist organization.125 
Furthermore, the standard to guarantee a neutral arbiter must be 
closely scrutinized. In states of emergency, the state apparatus often has 
a strong upper-hand and its power reaches far into the judicial branch, 
making the supposedly neutral branch of government another biased state 
institution. The Working Group should not only condemn the length of 
detentions and the denial of detainees to be afforded prompt and mean-
ingful legal process, but also condemn the state in tampering with neutral 
judges deciding detention cases. The Working Group must also highlight 
the unique complexities of military occupations, such as of Palestine and 
Kashmir, and the role the occupying power plays in consuming all prior 
unbiased aspects of the government, warranting stronger procedural due 
process guarantees when citizens are under an occupying power and sub-
ject to military tribunals. 
Compounding the vague state definitions of terrorism and the arbi-
trary reasons for arrest are the lack of procedural guarantees once a de-
tainee is finally afforded a chance to appear before a tribunal to plead 
their case. The right to be informed of the charges against the detainee, 
the right to counsel, and the right to a free and fair trial before a neutral 
arbiter are codified procedural standards that must be strongly ruled upon 
when violated in counter-terrorism cases during states of emergency. 
Such baseline procedural guarantees are critical to ensure lawful deten-
tions before addressing the substantive allegations of a crime. Even dur-
ing instances of public emergency involving military courts and tribunals, 
the international community and Working Group must push for con-
sistent adherence to the rule of law and international humanitarian law. 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
The declaration of a state of emergency cannot in itself justify nor 
excuse an arbitrary detention of an innocent non-combatant on a vague 
terrorism charge. In these grey area conflicts, the law on human rights 
should remain black and white. The Working Group should strengthen its 
jurisprudence against arbitrary detentions in states of emergency and oc-
cupations. The Working Group represents a critical body as the only char-
ter-based organ mandated to hear individual petitions from peaceful pro-
testors, activists, and innocent civilians seeking justice. Stronger codified 
safeguards against human rights abuses in the Working Group’s 
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jurisprudence can help lead states and the international community to-
ward more substantial change. Its mission and work must continue to 
strengthen human rights and call out states’ counter-terrorism and coun-
ter-dissent campaigns in their constant attempt to silence critical voices, 
such as Ahmad Qatamesh.126 The military occupations of Palestine and 
Kashmir especially deserve stronger procedural and substantive safe-
guards as situations most prone to human rights abuses. While peacetime 
may be suspended, the people’s fundamental rights should be continu-
ously guaranteed. 
As John Cerone writes, “whether and to what extent states are bound 
by human rights obligations with respect to . . . occupation . . . is one of 
the most controversial and politically charged issues in current human 
rights discourse.”127 The issue of state adherence to international human 
rights and humanitarian law has always been and will continue to be the 
greatest barrier in advancing human rights. Even the proposition of these 
stronger standards, or any at all, carries the dangerous possibility of states 
taking the codification of legal standards for granted to strategize ways 
around the law.128 But to face head-on the worst human rights crises of 
our time and not propose some legal limitations on the growing authori-
tarian power of states is to essentially relinquish the power of interna-
tional law. With such vague and flexible definitions and even murkier 
waters of conflict, there should persist coherent standards of human rights 
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